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Abstract 
 
This paper (1) examines the actual (as opposed to potential) impact of European 
Integration on national health care systems as a result of rulings of the European Court of 
Justice (ECJ) with regard to patient mobility (2). These rulings provoked a number of 
similar but far from identical responses across the Member States. Adaptation processes 
are indeed not straightforward. Member States, confronted with the deregulatory dynamic 
of the applications of the free movement rules, try to uphold their steering instruments as 
much as they can, whilst allowing patients to be treated abroad. This empirically driven 
paper provides a detailed assessment of how the Europeanisation of health care systems 
through ECJ cases sets off a dynamic process of creative adaptation at the national level. 
Through leverage (and some learning) actors alter the policies and politics of domestic 
health care systems. Factors that may explain the considerable differences between the 
reactions of Member States - also between Member States with similar health systems - 
include the likelihood of an exodus of patients, the compatibility between the European 
Union Law (EU) and national health care systems as well as the presence of reforms in the 
domestic system. The process of creative responses to EU law includes – for Member States 
confronted with long waiting lists – attempts to reduce the demand for exit, for example 
through contracting the domestic commercial sector. The study furthermore shows the 
agency by domestic actors who draw legitimacy from the EU setting to reinforce their 
position (or acquire one) at the national level. It thereby confirms the assertion that the 
effects of these ECJ rulings regarding patient mobility go beyond the narrow issue of 
patient mobility itself and that it can have an important impact on the domestic health 
care systems.  
 
                                                 
1  The legal material in section 2 of this paper, especially regarding Belgium, France, Luxemburg and the Netherlands, draws 
extensively on Coucheir and Jorens (2006), which was written in the context of the Europe for Patients research project 
carried out under the DG Research 6th framework programme (Ghent University partner). The usual disclaimer applies. 
2  We would like to thank Scott Greer, Chris Segaert, Amélie Becker, Matthew Gaskins, Anna Safuta, Irene Glinos and Nadia 
Carboni and the participants of the conference “European Ideas and Actions, their impacts on social and health policy, 
and on the Nordic and other European Models” held in Stockholm, March 26-27 2009 for their constructive feedback on 
earlier drafts of this paper. The usual disclaimer applies. 
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1. Setting the scene 
 
The impact of European Integration on national health care systems is increasingly 
analysed, and teaches us a lot about the potential effects of the different branches of EU 
law on domestic health care systems (see Mossialos et al., 2010 for a recent state of the 
art assessment). And yet surprisingly little is known about how European legislation 
resonates with Member States’ day-to-day policies and politics in this area (but see some 
of the studies we refer to below). This paper aims at filling that gap empirically, by 
analysing the actual (as opposed to potential) impact of European integration on national 
health care systems. We try to do so by examining how the European Union interacts with 
national health care systems as a result of rulings of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) 
with regard to patient mobility. Our empirical assessment – covering 13 Member States 
belonging to different families of health care systems – looks into the factors that 
determine the mechanisms and timing of ECJ case law as it finds its way into national 
arenas. Furthermore we will try to understand whether and how this case law impacts on 
the interaction between the stakeholders in the domestic arena.  
 
Our analysis illustrates as such how Member States deal with the deregulatory dynamics of 
the application of the free movement rules to health care (see Box 1). Steering 
instruments of health care systems such as collective and selective contracting or limiting 
the prices that providers can charge cannot be upheld abroad, and thus also come under 
pressure domestically.  
 
Our findings show some similarities, but also a wide diversity in the reactions of Member 
States, also of those with similar health care systems. We will see how several enabling 
and constraining factors determine the timing and mechanisms through which the Court 
rulings are taken into account (to varying degrees) in national policies.  
 
Member States make a trade off between the compliance costs on the one hand and the 
costs of non-compliance on the other. Non-compliance costs relate to the risk of being 
sanctioned by the EU institutions or national courts. These include infringement 
procedures by the European Commission and court cases introduced by domestic patients 
(or providers from abroad). Member States confronted with more court cases seem to do 
more efforts to adapt their health system. The chance of sanctions occurring is however 
often perceived as a long-term risk. This reduces their weight in the trade off for 
policymakers, whose perspective is in principle rather short-term.  
 
Calculating compliance costs on the other hand, is a rather complex exercise in this 
domain. A first type of compliance cost, similar for all Member States, is the loss of 
control in organising and managing the domestic health care system. Nearly all Member 
States initially took a very reserved attitude, arguing that their system was “different” 
from the specific system under scrutiny by the Court. Member States thus exploited as 
much as possible their powers to interpret the scope of application of the Court rulings in a 
minimalist way. Implementation took place gradually and only when all doubts about the 
scope of application were removed (through subsequent Court rulings).  
 
Secondly, compliance costs are higher when the free movement of services principles 
collide with the applicable mechanism in the domestic health care system. Our findings 
show that principles of the Court rulings are more easily incorporated in health systems 
that do not need to substantially modify the existing procedures and policies. On the other 
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hand, when the domestic and EU system are largely incompatible, adaptation is only 
marginal. 
 
In the third, place there is the perceived risk for an exodus of patients. Member States 
fearing that patients may be willing to make use of the new possibilities to go abroad in 
large numbers are less likely to fully implement the Court rulings. These include Member 
States with long waiting lists, small Member States who do not ensure the whole range of 
specialised care at home, and Member States who fear that their citizens perceive care 
abroad as being of a higher quality. These Member States develop policies to address 
factors underlying the demand for exit, in particular waiting lists. Furthermore we will see 
how health authorities try to channel as much as possible patients to selected providers 
abroad, integrated in the statutory system of the country of care provision or providers 
with whom some kind of agreement has been concluded. In that way they try to avoid an 
uncontrolled ‘exodus’.  
 
Fourthly, domestic reform efforts in the health system push Member States to assess 
whether the proposed changes are ‘EU proof’. In other words: European law is likely to be 
taken into account more seriously when (even small) reforms are undertaken in the 
national system. At such moments checks and balances incorporated in the domestic 
system change in any case, new balances have to be found and the compliance costs of 
taking into account EU law (on top of things) are perceived as being lower. The paper will 
look into the national strategies developed to reduce compliance costs. 
 
 
Box 1: Patient mobility in the EU: the rules of the game in a nutshell (3) 
 
The classical EU mechanism under which patients are entitled to receive treatment abroad (other 
than patients paying for such treatment privately) is the Regulation on the coordination of social 
security schemes (former Regulation 1408/71, currently Regulation 883/2004) (Council of the 
European Communities,1971; European Parliament and Council, 2004). This regulation entitles 
patients whose treatment becomes necessary during a stay in another Member State (for example 
people travelling, studying or working abroad) to the same benefits as patients insured in the host 
Member State. It also provides for planned treatment in other Member States which is subject to 
prior authorisation, based on an authorisation form commonly known as the E112. We will refer to 
this as the Regulation based procedure. 
 
In a series of judgments over the last decade, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) has however 
made clear that health care provided in another Member State against remuneration, both in and 
outside a hospital environment, is an economic activity in the meaning of the EC Treaty. As a 
consequence, the Treaty provisions on the freedom to provide services apply. In successive rulings it 
was clarified that these principles apply irrespective of how and by whom health care is funded, and 
irrespective of the way Member States organise and finance their social security systems (4). Since 
2006 - in the famous Watts case (5) - it became clear that the free movement of service principles 
also apply to National Health Service systems based on integrated public funding and provision of 
health services. We will refer to this procedure to receive care abroad as the Treaty based 
procedure. 
                                                 
3  For more detailed accounts of the application of the legal framework of services applied to patient mobility in the EU see 
for example (Mossialos, 2010; Jorens, 2005; Hervey, 2004)  
4  Case C-158/96, Raymond Kohll v. Union des caisses de maladie, Judgment of 28 April 1998; Case C-120/95, Nicolas Decker 
v. Caisse de maladie des employés privés, Judgment of 28 April 1998; Case C-157/99, B.S.M. Geraets-Smits v. Stichting 
Ziekenfonds VGZ and H.T.M. Peerbooms v. Stichting CZ Groep Zorgverzekeringen, Judgment of 12 July 2001; Case C-
385/99, V.G. Müller-Fauré c/ Onderlinge Waarborgmaatschappij O.Z. Zorgverzekeringen UA and E.E.M. Van Riet c/ 
Onderlinge Waarborgmaatschappij ZAO Zorgverzekeringen, Judgment of 13 May 2003, Case C-444/05 Stamatelaki, 
Judgement of 19 April 2007. 
5  Case C-372/04 Watts, Judgement of 16 May 2006 
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Box 1: Patient mobility in the EU: the rules of the game in a nutshell (continued from page 5) 
 
The Court also clarified that making the reimbursement for care received abroad subject to the 
requirement that the patient must first receive authorisation from his domestic social protection 
system is an obstacle to freedom to provide services. However this barrier may be justified for 
intramural care by the need to ensure the provision of a balanced medical and hospital service 
accessible to all, and the maintenance of a treatment facility or medical service on national 
territory.  
 
As a consequence, statutory social protection systems have to reimburse their affiliates for health 
care provided in another Member State up to the level of reimbursement provided by their own 
system, if this care is included in the domestic benefit package. If the costs actually incurred are 
lower than that amount, reimbursement can be limited to the actual costs.  
For hospital care Member States may require that this reimbursement is subject to prior 
authorisation. This authorisation must be given if the domestic system cannot provide the same or 
equally effective treatment within a medically acceptable time limit, considering the patient’s 
medical conditions, course of illness, nature of disability, as well as the degree of pain.  
The conditions on which benefits are granted pursuant to the legislation of the State of affiliation 
remain enforceable where treatment is received abroad, provided that these conditions are 
necessary to protect a general interest objective and are proportional to this objective. The Court 
accepted in this respect for instance the requirement that a general practitioner should be 
consulted prior to consulting a specialist.  
 
However not all national conditions and formalities, even though they apply in a non-discriminatory 
manner, can be upheld in a cross-border situation. The most notable exception is the requirement 
to only be treated by a contracted provider. The Court ruled in the Geraets-Smits and Peerbooms 
case that if the assumption of the costs of treatment given by (both domestic and foreign) providers 
who are not contracted by the sickness fund or health system, is made conditional on the granting 
of prior authorisation, then this is liable to affect foreign providers more than providers established 
in the State of insurance. This condition is therefore seen as an obstacle to the free movement 
principles (6). This applies even if foreign providers have the same possibility to enter into 
contracts. Foreign providers are thus in principle entitled to be placed on the same footing as 
domestic contracted providers, even if they do not have to comply with the requirements included 
in the contracts with which domestic providers have to comply, in particular with regard to price 
setting. 
 
In the Vanbraekel ruling, the Court stipulated that the provisions on the free movement of services 
act as a complement to the rights of E112-holders. If, for a holder of a form E112 the amount 
reimbursable under the legislation of the State where treatment is received is lower than the 
amount payable under the legislation of the State of affiliation, the patient should receive a 
complement in order to guarantee him a level of coverage which is at least equivalent to the level 
of cover provided by the legislation of the State of affiliation (7). This is relevant when the insured 
person was required to make a financial contribution to the cost of treatment abroad.  
 
In an attempt to codify the complex Court rulings, the European Commission presented a legislative 
proposal on patients’ rights in cross border care in July 2008 (CEC, 2008).  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
6  Case C-157/99, Geraets-Smits and Peerbooms, above n. 4, at 66-68. 
7  Case C-368/98, Vanbraekel , Judgment of 12 July 2001,, at 45.   
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2. National policies and politics in the wake of the ECJ rulings  
 
This section analyses how Member States reacted to the judgements of the European Court 
of Justice (and national court rulings) with regard to reimbursement of care provided in 
another Member State. Furthermore, it provides some examples on how actors involved in 
the national health care systems tried to take advantage of the newly created 
opportunities. The analysis is based on 13 case studies. Systematic information has been 
collected France, the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxemburg. This has been complemented 
with desk research for Germany, Denmark, Ireland, Hungary, Poland, Spain, the UK, 
Sweden and Slovenia.  
  
For analysing the case studies, we grouped them according to the characteristics of the 
health care systems of the respective countries. This is based on the typology presented in 
Table 1 below. 
 
 
Table 1: Typology of public health care systems: case studies 
Category 
(funding) 
Social Insurance National Health Service 
Type 
(payment) 
Reimbursement Benefits in Kind Benefits in Kind 
Case studies Belgium 
France  
Luxembourg 
 
Germany 
Hungary  
Netherlands (8) 
Poland 
Slovenia 
Denmark  
Ireland 
Spain  
Sweden 
United Kingdom 
Source: own adaptation from Sindbjerg Martinsen (2007) and Palm e.a. (2000). 
 
European health care systems can broadly speaking be divided into two categories: social 
health insurance systems and National Health Services (NHS) systems.  
 
Social health insurance systems are mainly funded by means of earmarked social 
contributions from employers and employees. Private, often not for profit actors such as 
sickness funds and hospitals- have an important role in funding and provision of care. A 
further distinction can be made within this category between reimbursement systems and 
benefit in kind systems. Care can be paid for through a fee for service, in which case the 
patient or provider is reimbursed for the costs. Providers can also be remunerated at a flat 
rate, a lump sum based on the population size they serve. In the latter case the patient 
has –often free of charge- access to the providers with whom the scheme concluded 
agreements for service delivery. Patients have thus the right to benefits in kind. 
 
NHS systems are mainly funded through general taxation. Delivery and funding of health 
care are typically integrated into one single, public body. Hospitals are state owned and 
general practitioners (GPs) have contracts with the NHS. Patients do have free of charge 
access to these public or contracted providers. Patients have thus access to benefits in 
kind.  
 
                                                 
8  After the 2006 reform the Dutch system can no longer be considered as a clear benefit in kind system, and in fact became 
a stand alone type of system, see below. 
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The case studies include all three health care systems based on reimbursement (Belgium, 
France and Luxemburg) and five health insurance systems based on benefits in kind 
(Germany, Hungary, the Netherlands, Poland and Slovenia) and four National Health 
Systems (Denmark, Ireland, Sweden and the UK).  
 
This typology should of course be read with the necessary caution. Health care systems are 
dynamic, change over time and incorporate elements of systems with different 
characteristics. Reforms can furthermore overrule the basic characteristics of a system. 
This has become most apparent in the period we study here (1998-2008) in the 
Netherlands. After the 2006 reform the Dutch system became in fact a stand alone type of 
system, of which we will highlight some characteristics below. 
 
This wide coverage allows us to analyse on the one hand the similarities and dissimilarities 
in the reactions of the systems belonging to the same family and on the other hand the 
divergent or concurrent reactions of countries having a different type of health care 
system. 
 
In what follows we will analyse the reactions to the ECJ case law on patient mobility per 
cluster of systems. Within each cluster we will first describe the implementation process 
and reactions of stakeholders in each country. Next, we will try to explain the similarities 
and dissimilarities in the reactions. 
 
 
2.1 Social insurance systems based on reimbursement of care 
 
The social insurance systems based on reimbursement of care were the first ones to come 
in the legal and political spotlight. The initial Kohll (9) and Decker (10) rulings concerned a 
health care system of this type. The next section analyses the reactions in Belgium, France 
and Luxemburg.  
 
2.1.1 Assessing implementation and politics 
 
Belgium reacted very promptly to the rulings by implementing the most important aspects. 
The National Institute for Health and Disability Insurance (INAMI) issued already in 1998 a 
Circular on the application of the Kohll and Decker rulings (11),with the aim of giving an 
interpretation of these rulings. Pursuant to this Circular, insured persons were entitled, 
subject to certain conditions but without prior authorisation, to be reimbursed for the 
costs of cross-border non-hospital care not exceeding EUR 500. Subsequent Circulars have 
progressively broadened this right (for example removing the maximum ceiling), without 
however changing the approach in any fundamental way (12). The currently applicable 
Circular states that non-hospital treatments in other Member States are reimbursed at the 
rates of the Belgian sickness insurance, provided that the conditions for assumption which 
prevail in Belgium (e.g. authorisation) are fulfilled. Pharmaceutical products purchased in 
another Member State qualify for reimbursement if its characteristics are identical to a 
pharmaceutical reimbursed in Belgium. 
 
                                                 
9  Case C-158/96, Raymond Kohll v. Union des caisses de maladie, above, n. 5. 
10  Case C-120/95, Nicolas Decker v. Caisse de maladie des employés privés,, above, n. 5  
11 INAMI Circular nr. 98/258 of 5 August 1998.  
12 The current Circular is the one of 16 March 2006,VI nr. 2006/117, complemented by one of 7 June 2008, extending the 
procedure without authorisation to the 3 EER States and Switzerland.  
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For hospital care prior authorisation is required. Belgian insured persons who go abroad 
with a E112 form and have to pay user charges, are entitled to an additional 
reimbursement insofar as the level of cover (the amount publicly funded) under Belgian 
legislation is higher than the level of cover provided under the legislation of the State of 
treatment.    
 
Interestingly, in a similar vein of what was done in France (see further down this section), 
the latest versions of the above mentioned Circular have extended the definition of 
hospital care. The Circular lists now several treatments that do not involve overnight stay 
but which require, “a hospital infrastructure with all the equipment which normally can be 
found in a hospital to provide them” (13). The annexed list is broader than its French 
equivalent.  
 
Whereas Belgium does not face important outflows of patients, the increasing inflow of 
patients from abroad has been the subject of heavy political debate. There is a concern 
that treatment of foreign patients could lead to increasing commercial behavior of the 
(mainly not for profit) domestic providers. The Federation of Enterprises in Belgium (FEB, 
Fédération des entreprises de Belgique) launched the debate on opening up the Belgian 
health care market to foreign patients, referring to the possibilities created by the ECJ 
rulings (De Greef and Thomaes, 2006).  
 
This initiative had two consequences. First, a law has been adopted to change the rules for 
hospital funding, making a legal distinction between patients covered by the Belgian public 
system and (foreign) patients that are considered as “private” patients and to whom 
higher tariffs can be charged (14). That way, hospitals have more incentives to attract 
foreign patients. “Private” patients were so far not known in the Belgian system, as all 
care providers in Belgium are integrated in the publicly funded system. The legitimation 
for the changed legislation is that the Belgian tariffs do not cover real costs. However, due 
to political disagreement and technical problems, this law has not yet been implemented. 
Secondly, a series of public and not for profit hospitals, including several major university 
hospitals, created - at the initiative of the aforementioned FEB - an association called 
“Healthcare Belgium”, with the aim to promote Belgian health care abroad. This is the 
first time that hospitals, traditionally organised in umbrella organisations of the not for 
profit sector, organise themselves at the initiative of the national organisation of Belgian 
enterprises, which suggests a shift of focus and interests.  
 
As Luxembourg was directly involved in the initial Kohll and Decker cases, the national 
authorities examined the consequences of the decisions promply and thoroughly. The 
Union des Caisses de Maladies (UCM), the social security authority that was a party in these 
court cases, issued its opinion as early as May 1998. A new procedure was introduced 
whereby medical devices, pharmaceuticals and out-patient care are reimbursed without 
prior authorisation (Palm et al., 2000; Kieffer, 2003). Interestingly, this procedure has not 
been incorporated into national legislation. Patients are informed about the possibility and 
the procedure in an official note that is attached to the negative reply on a request for a 
E112 form for ambulatory care (15).  
 
For assumption of the costs of hospital treatment abroad, prior authorisation remains 
required. Reimbursement extends to co-payments and co-insurance rates levied in the 
Member State where treatment is obtained, minus the co-payment charged under 
                                                 
13 INAMI Circular VI nr. 2006/117 of 16 March 2006.   
14  Loi du 4 juin 2007 modifiant la législation en vue de promouvoir la mobilité des patients, Moniteur Belge 25/7/07. 
15 Written exchange, legal advisor, Caisse nationale de la santé Luxembourg (d'Gesondheetskeess), 4 August 2009. 
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Luxembourg legislation (16). Accommodation expenses and costs of an accompanying 
person can also be assumed under certain conditions (17).Hospital care however is to be 
provided by a provider integrated in the statutory system of the country of care provision. 
This is a requirement we will come across in different forms in other Member States and 
which shows that Member States want to keep control over the selection of the providers 
for which they do reimburse care abroad. Luxemburg justifies this by stating that the 
Luxemburg health insurance does not dispose of tariffs for hospital care, and that a lot of 
these treatments are even not available in Luxemburg and do not have a domestic tariff 
(Kieffer, 2003). Reimbursement is consequently based on the official tariffs of the country 
of care provision. Only when the authorised treatment cannot be performed by a health 
care provider operating within the framework of the statutory social security system of the 
Member State of treatment, reimbursement is guaranteed according to Luxembourg 
tariffs (18). Luxemburg argues that hospital treatment in Luxemburg is not a service 
provided against remuneration and thus implicitly suggests that hospital treatment does 
not fall under the scope of the free movement rules (Gouvernement Luxembourgeois, 
2007). 
 
The main result of the Kohll and Decker judgements for Luxemburg was however a major 
confrontation with its medical corps. In Luxembourg all health professionals are 
compulsory submitted to collective agreements between the professional groups and the 
public health insurance system. The agreement system that is in place since 1930 requires 
the professionals to comply with imposed tariffs and other conditions. Following the Court 
rulings, the health insurance system was however obliged to reimburse costs of providers 
abroad, even though these providers were not bound by the official tariffs, or by any other 
constraint imposed by the agreement system. The Luxemburg medical profession perceived 
the opening of borders and the reimbursement of care provided by foreign providers not 
bound by the agreements as (reverse) discrimination. Consequently, negotiations to adapt 
the medical agreement were suspended. More in particular the discussions concerning the 
introduction of profiles of medical activity to trace abuse of the system were blocked. 
Furthermore, Luxembourg physicians were calling to abandon the compulsory agreement 
system. This was at stake in a doctors’ strike 2000. In response, the government was 
forced to increase reimbursement fees by on average 6.5%. The Court rulings thus seriously 
damaged the cooperation between the doctors and the public health insurers (Kieffer, 
2003). 
 
In France, there has been a more gradual acceptance of the principles stemming from the 
Court’s health care rulings, in several domains. The initial reaction of the administrative 
authorities has been one of complete rejection. In a Circular letter dated 28 June 1998, 
the Director of Social Security asked the Sickness Insurance Fund not to take account of 
the Kohll and Decker judgments, as long as their possible implementation has not been the 
object of discussion among Member States. Fears were expressed that a unilateral opening 
would jeopardise the relations between sickness insurance and the health care 
professionals, notably as regards cost containment.  
 
An infringement proceeding initiated by the European Commission in October 1999 as well 
as some national court cases brought about the revision of the initially obstructive 
governmental position (Obermaier, 2008). A first breach was created by a Circular of the 
social security administration in 2001 (19), which instructed the Health insurance funds to 
                                                 
16 Code des Assurances Sociales, Article 26 § 1 
17 Ibid, Article 28. 
18 Ibid., Article 26. 
19 DSS/DACI nr. 2001-120, Circular of 1 March 2001. 
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reimburse the costs of optical devices purchased in another Member State without prior 
authorisation, subject to the condition that the relevant provisions of French legislation 
were complied with. This opening, deemed “not liable to put at risk the national social 
security system”, corresponded to a strict application of the Decker ruling. According to 
another Circular in 2003 sickness funds should proceed to the assumption of the costs of 
pharmaceuticals purchased in another Member State, if these products are included in the 
list of reimbursable products in France (20) or if their composition and form are identical to 
a pharmaceutical included in the French list (21).  
 
As to medical services, the 2003 Circular drew attention to the French system of national 
agreements, within the framework of which nearly all French self-employed doctors 
practise. These agreements, which are signed between doctors’ representatives and the 
national sickness insurance funds, include a number of provisions regarding conditions of 
practice and list the tariffs doctors are allowed to charge (les tarifs conventionnels). 
These tariffs also serve as a basis for reimbursement of the patient (Sandier et al., 2004). 
The Circular provided that the national agreements could not produce effects outside the 
French territory, and thus could not be extended as such to health care professionals 
established in another Member State. It went on to state that, in order not to favour these 
foreign health care professionals in relation to their French colleagues who expressly 
adhered to the national agreement – and, hence, accepted to act in accordance with its 
terms – it is appropriate to treat the former as if they were French professionals who opted 
not to take part to that agreement. Accordingly, the costs of cross-border extramural 
treatment were assumed on the basis of the tarifs d’autorité (the amounts of which did 
not exceed EUR 1 per visit). However, according to the Circular, the systematic application 
of the almost insignificant tarifs d’autorité is likely to constitute a new restriction to the 
free provision of services as interpreted by the ECJ. As a consequence, French legislation 
was modified again soon after. A Decree (décret) of 2005 (22) stipulates that the sickness 
insurance funds proceed to the reimbursement of the costs of treatment provided in a 
Member State of the European Union/EEA, under the same conditions as if the treatment 
were received in France (23). The applied tariffs are henceforth the ones that apply for 
French contracted providers.  
 
For ambulatory care, no prior authorisation is required (24). Prior authorisation is 
nevertheless required for the assumption of the costs of hospital treatment and of 
treatment necessitating the use of heavy medical equipment (25). In regions in which some 
specific treatments are permanently unavailable, an authorisation must be delivered 
automatically (26). The Commission referred France in 2008 however to the European Court 
of Justice for having extended the requirement for prior authorisation to certain types of 
non-hospital treatment (27). 
 
                                                 
20 DSS/DACI nr. 2003-286, Circular of 16 June 2003.  
21 DSS/DACI nr. 2004-134, Circular of 23 March 2004. 
22 Decree nr. 2005-386 of 19 April 2005 
23 In order for their costs to be assumed, the provision of certain treatments, such as physiotherapist treatment, requires 
prior consent (entente préalable) of the fund. This requirement, which applies to certain care provided in France, must 
also be fulfilled by insured persons who intend to receive the concerned treatment in another EU/EEA Member State. On 
referral by a general practitioner, see below.  
24 Code de la sécurité sociale, Article R. 332-3. 
25 Code de la sécurité sociale,  Article R. 332-4. 
26  DSS/DACI nr 2005/235, Circular of 19 May 2005 (LHERNOULD, 2009).  
27 Case C-512/08, Commission of the European Communities v French Republic.  
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Furthermore, following an ECJ court case in 2004 (28), reimbursement of analysis by foreign 
biomedical laboratories is since 2007 no longer subject to an administrative authorisation 
of the laboratory (29).   
 
Until that year the French legislation did not specify in which situations patients receiving 
treatment abroad (following the Regulation based procedure) were entitled to 
reimbursement up to the reimbursement level applicable in France (the Vanbraekel 
ruling). This led to diverging decisions of different competent funding institutions. 
Following an infringement procedure launched by the European Commission in 2007, the 
French administration specified that the supplement should apply to both occasional and 
planned care and for any kind of medical services (Lhernould, 2009) (30). This however did 
not withhold the Commission from referring the case to the European Court of Justice (31). 
 
A final illustration of how Member States incorporate EU law while introducing new 
elements in their domestic system is the implementation of a mild gate-keeping procedure 
which was adopted in mid 2004 as part of the reorganisation of the French sickness 
insurance scheme. People can register with an attending doctor of their choice (GP or 
specialist) who will be responsible for coordinating the patient’s treatment pathway (32). If 
a patient chooses not to register or to see another doctor without prior referral, the 
reimbursement level for medical treatment will be lower. With a view to ensuring that the 
new attending doctor policy is EU proof, insured persons can choose a doctor established in 
another Member State of the EU/EEA (33). However, in order to be recognised as a doctor 
the foreign health care professional has to conclude an agreement with the French sickness 
insurance funds, specifying the obligations which he has to fulfil. 
 
2.1.2 Social insurance systems based on reimbursement: (dis-)similarities 
 
A comparison of the reactions of this first cluster of countries to the Court rulings allows 
drawing some initial conclusions. In principle, this group of countries should be the most 
“fit” to comply with the Court rulings. They have an explicit catalogue of benefits, 
defining the tariffs of individual treatments, including reimbursement levels. This should 
allow them to apply the same tariffs to care provided abroad, which makes it in principle 
quite easy for them to adapt their systems. Nevertheless, there seem to be great 
reluctance to implement the court rulings and, besides some similarities in their approach, 
important dissimilarities have been traced. To understand the differences in the 
approaches, we need to take a closer look at the different characteristics of the respective 
health care systems.  
 
A first important characteristic distinguishes Belgium on the one hand from Luxemburg and 
France on the other hand. In all three countries a system of collective agreements applies 
between the health professionals and the health insurers/sickness funds, defining the 
prices and reimbursement tariffs for care. However, all health professionals are obliged to 
adhere to these agreements in Luxemburg, while professionals not having adhered to the 
agreements in France can only have their care services reimbursed at a marginal level 
(tarifs d’autorité). In Belgium by contrast all care is reimbursed at the same level, 
whether or not providers adhere to the agreements. Providers who do not adhere have 
freedom of price setting. This makes the Belgian system the most “fit” to the rulings with 
                                                 
28 Case C-496/01, Commission v. France, Judgment of 11 March 2004  
29 Decree n° 2007-1494 
30 DSS/DACI/2008/242, Circular of 21 July 2008 
31 Case C-512/08, Commission of the European Communities v French Republic. 
32 Act nr. 2004-810. 
33 DSS/DACI nr. 2005-275, Circular of 27 May 2005 
© OSE asbl 
OSE Research Paper No.3    13 
regard to the reimbursement of care provided in another Member State, at least for 
ambulatory care, and probably explains the promptness of the Belgian reaction and the 
great - at least initial - reluctance in France, that indeed explicitly justified its initial 
response stating that it did not want to favour foreign health care professionals in relation 
to their French colleagues who expressly adhere to the national agreements (34). Similarly, 
in Luxemburg the medical corps reacted heavily to the Court rulings and the discrimination 
they could provoke. Luxemburg is in this respect more vulnerable than France: given the 
size of the country, patients can easily cross the border for care. 
 
This brings us to the second difference between the three countries. Contrary to Belgium 
and France, Luxemburg does not, due to its small seize, provide the whole range of 
specialised treatments at home and has a long tradition of authorising patients to go 
abroad for care, based on former Regulation 1408/71 (see Palm e.a., 2000). The lack of 
domestic availability of certain treatments, combined with the fact that all patients live 
close to a border, make Luxemburg a country where the likelihood that patients will try to 
use the newly created possibilities for care abroad is very high. It is not a coincidence that 
Mr Decker and Mr Kohll, who were the first voicing their willingness to exit the domestic 
system through the ECJ, were both Luxemburg citizens. This explains why Luxemburg, 
even if it did implement the Court rulings to a large extent, tries to make the “Treaty” 
based procedure (see Box 1) less attractive than the procedure it traditionally applies 
based on Regulation 1408/71, now Regulation 883/2004. Luxemburg basically makes the 
“Regulation” based procedure as attractive as possible financially, by providing 
reimbursement of additional costs. Also the administrative handling of the Treaty based 
procedure is less attractive. As stated by the president of the Union des Caisses de 
Maladies during a hearing in European Parliament “there is the risk also, and a real risk, 
that such doctor’s bills will not be given favourable treatment when presented in 
Luxembourg to the insurance organisations. That is why we recommend that patients 
should (…) use their E112 form” (Kieffer, 2005). Similarly, the Luxemburg authorities seem 
to somewhat “hide” the existing Treaty based system. Patients are only informed about its 
possibilities when their application based on the Regulation based procedure failed. 
 
The final implementation of the EC rules in France and Belgium is quite similar. In both 
countries ambulatory care received without prior authorisation in another Member State is 
reimbursed at the rates of the domestic sickness insurance, provided that the conditions 
for assumption which prevail at home are fulfilled. Both tried to identify pharmaceuticals 
that have the same active ingredient as those reimbursed at home, even if they are sold 
under a different (brand) name. Finally, the definition of hospital care has in both 
countries been widened, as compared to the narrow definition of care for which an 
overnight stay is necessary: it also includes care for which planning is necessary (in essence 
relating to heavy medical equipment). It is interesting to see that the widening of the 
Belgian definition was inspired by the French policy practice (35).  
 
 
2.2 Social insurance systems based on benefits in kind 
 
Prevailing doubts about the applicability of the Treaty provisions to health insurance 
systems based on benefits in kind were fully removed with the Geraets-Smits and 
Peerbooms as well as the Müller-Fauré and Van Riet ECJ rulings. We analysed the 
developments in two “old” Member States, the Netherlands and Germany, and three 
                                                 
34 DSS/DACI nr. 2003-286, Circular of 16 June 2003. 
35 Oral discussion, Advisor international healthcare conventions, INAMI, spring 2008. 
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“new” Member States, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia. These are discussed in the next 
sections. 
 
2.2.1 Assessing implementation and politics 
 
The case of the Netherlands is an interesting one for more than one reason. First, two 
landmark ECJ rulings (Geraets-Smits and Peerbooms and Müller-Fauré and Van Riet) have 
their origin in this Member State, which, as will be demonstrated below, went to great 
effort to comply with the principles stemming from these judgments. Second, the country 
has (had) a problem with waiting lists, which, being a major push factor for the cross-
border movements of patients, might help to explain the abundance of national court 
cases addressing the right to seek health care outside the national territory (36). Thirdly, 
the Netherlands held a unique position among other Member States in that about 30 % of 
the population were not compulsorily insured for health care and were expected to take 
out private health insurance. As a result, this category of persons did not fall within the 
ambit of former Regulation 1408/71. This situation has come to an end on 1 January 2006, 
with the entry into force of the new Health Insurance Act (37), pursuant to which the entire 
population is obliged to take out sickness insurance with one of the competing private 
health insurance companies. The distinction between the compulsorily insured with a 
sickness fund and privately insured was thus abandoned. From the outset of the legislative 
process leading to the 2006 reform, due attention has been paid to the compatibility of the 
future scheme with Community internal market requirements. 
 
According to the Dutch interpretation of the initial Kohll and Decker rulings in 1998, the 
Dutch system of contracting was in conformity with EU law. Health insurers can conclude 
contracts with foreign providers if there is a need for it, while they may not refuse to 
contract with a provider solely on the grounds that the provider is located in another 
Member State. In addition, no distinction could be made between domestic and foreign 
non-contracted providers in those cases where patients had the right to go to non-
contracted providers with prior authorisation from their insurer (38). In 2002 sickness funds 
were advised to conclude contracts with foreign providers if they planned to systematically 
offer their members access to cross-border health care (39).  
 
The Dutch practice to contract with foreign providers is not only - and arguably not even in 
the first place - inspired by the Court rulings. The domestic political pressure to address 
the waiting times certainly pushed the Netherlands to look for appropriate answers by 
offering its citizens treatment abroad (Baeten, 2002; Glinos et al., 2005).   
 
After the Geraets-Smits and Peerbooms and Müller-Fauré and Van Riet Court rulings it 
became clear that this approach of contracting abroad had to be complemented by a 
second approach of pure reimbursement of care. The traditional Dutch approach already 
embraced a dual system with benefits in kind for sickness fund patients and 
reimbursement system for privately insured patients. Reimbursing care abroad was thus 
not completely alien to the system. 
 
The possibility has been created from 2005 onwards to obtain care from a provider which is 
not contracted by the sickness fund, at home or abroad, under certain conditions. Based 
                                                 
36 The situation with regard to the Netherlands has been updated until 2007. 
37 Zorgverzekeringswet  Act of 16 June 2005, Staatsblad 2005, 358.  
38 Ziekenfondsraad, Grensoverschrijdende zorg: arresten Decker en Kohll, Aan de uitvoeringsorganen ZFW en AWBZ, 
Circulairenummer ZFW/38/98, AWBZ/31/98, of 15 July 1998. 
39 CVZ, Circulaire 02/021 met betrekking tot grensoverschrijdende zorg, 2 May 2002. 
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on this provision, an arrangement provided for the assumption of the costs of extramural 
care received in an EU Member State without prior authorisation (40). For intramural care 
from a non-contracted care provider, prior authorisation remained necessary (41). 
Following several national court rulings, it became clear that hospital treatment abroad 
could not be refused if the patient could not be treated in a contracted hospital within 
waiting times corresponding to the Dutch norms defining acceptable waiting times (Treek 
norms) (42).  
 
Based on the health care reform sickness funds were furthermore no longer obliged to 
engage contracts with all domestic care institutions, such as hospitals. This new law 
provided the legal basis for Dutch sickness funds to agreements with foreign hospitals, in a 
reaction to the Geraets-Smits and Peerbooms ruling. It had been pointed out by the ECJ 
that this possibility, although applied in practice, was not included in law. The concerned 
foreign hospitals must provide care within the framework of the social security system 
applicable in the country of care provision (43). The justification given for this requirement 
is to ensure at least the quality level deemed in the state of treatment is acceptable (44).  
 
The reimbursement of the costs of the (extra- and intramural) care amounts to the 
expenses actually incurred and can not be higher than the costs which can reasonably be 
deemed to be in conformity with the market circumstances (45). The latter provision aims 
to avoid having to assume medical costs incurred abroad, without being able to control the 
tariffs (46). To determine the tariff, it has to be assessed to which Diagnosis Treatment 
Combination (DBC, the Dutch version of DRG’s47) the medical interventions 
abroad resemble most (48).  
 
As from 1 January 2006 a new sickness insurance system has been introduced. The entire 
population is now obliged to take out sickness insurance with one of the competing private 
health insurance companies and contains a uniform arrangement of insured persons’ 
entitlements. All insured persons have henceforth a choice between a so-called restitution 
policy, a benefits in kind policy or a combination of both. If the insured person has opted 
for a restitution policy, she can turn to any provider of health care anywhere in the world 
and is entitled to the reimbursement of the costs incurred (49). However, here too, the 
health insurer is not obliged to reimburse costs which are higher then what can be deemed 
reasonably appropriate in the Dutch market circumstances (50).  
 
In principle, the insured person who has opted for benefits in kind policy has to turn to 
those providers of care – either domestic or foreign – who are contracted by the health 
insurer. He has however the right to go to a provider – either domestic or foreign – who is 
not contracted by the health insurer and be reimbursed an amount which is determined by 
                                                 
40 Arrangement of 16 August 2005 on the implementation of Article 9 ZFW and Article 10 AWBZ, Article 2 § 1. 
41 Ziekenfondswet, Article 3 § 1 and 9, §3 as amended by the Law of 9 December 2004. 
42 CVZ, Tweede aanvullende circulaire inzake arrest Müller-Fauré en Van riet n.a.v. uitspraken Centrale Raad van Beroep 
d.d. 18 juni 2004, Circulaire 04/45, College voor zorgverzekeringen, Diemen, 1 september 2004 
(http://www.cvz.nl/resources/circ0445_tcm13-9078.pdf). 
43 Ziekenfondswet, Article 1 as amended by the Law of 9 December 2004. 
44 Zorgverzekeringswet, Kamerstukken II, 2003-04, nr. 29.763, 3, 80.  
45 In Dutch: “Niet meer dan de kosten die in de Nederlandse marktomstandigheden in redelijkheid passend zijn te achten”. 
46 A national court ruling in 2004 had held that, in view of the absence of an assumption arrangement, the costs of 
extramural care abroad should in principle be reimbursed in its entirety. CRvB, in its judgment of 18 June 2004 (nr. 
02/1641 ZFW). 
47 DBC: Diagnose-Behandel Combinatie (Diagnosis Treatment Combination), DRG: Diagnoses Related Groups. 
48 CVZ, Commissie adviezen, Verkorte weergave van de in de commissie verstrekkingenschillen besproken adviezen van de 
laatste zes maanden, Diemen, nr. 25112505, meeting of 16 March 2006.  
49 Zorgverzekeringswet, Article 11. 
50 Besluit zorgverzekering, Article 2.2 § 2 . 
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the insurer in its policy (full or partial) (51). Noticeably, this right has been incorporated in 
order to comply with the Court rulings and create new rights not only for patients 
searching for treatment abroad, but also for patients that are treated in the domestic 
system (52). Interesting furthermore is that the law does not stipulate a minimum level of 
assumption: the explanatory statement to the health insurance law (ZVW) confines itself to 
stating that the level of assumption should not be such as to create a de facto obstacle to 
the provision of care in another Member State (53). It does however not really seem to aim 
to encourage patients to make use of this procedure.  
 
It follows from the above that under the new Dutch scheme, according to which the 
authorisation requirement is abolished altogether, the distinction between intramural and 
extramural care is no longer relevant. Furthermore, there is no longer a need to interpret 
the concept of undue delay.  
  
In its immediate reaction to the initial Court rulings the German government denied that 
the Decker/Kohll case law had any consequence for the German system of statutory health 
insurance (SHI) or national authorisation policies on the grounds that the decisions applied 
only to health care systems reimbursing the costs of treatment (Sindbjerg Martinsen, 
2005). A Joint Working Group, consisting of the German states (Länder), the federal 
associations of sickness funds and the Ministry of Health concluded in 1999 that the 
economic freedoms of the EU did not apply to in-kind German-style benefit systems 
(Obermaier, 2008). It should be noted, however that the federal associations of sickness 
funds pleaded in their own assessment in 1999 to handle Kohll and Decker strategically, 
and recommended to analyse whether and when the sickness funds should be allowed to 
conclude contracts with foreign care providers, analogous to the Netherlands (Obermaier, 
2008). 
 
The judgment in Müller-Fauré and Van Riet in 2003, in which it was made clear that social 
security systems based on benefits in kind also had to conform to the Kohll and Decker 
jurisprudence, sparked a process of amending social security legislation.  
 
The legislation was changed accordingly as one aspect in a comprehensive act that 
fundamentally reformed German statutory health insurance. The legal change, which took 
effect from 1 January 2004, provides that insured persons are entitled to reimbursement of 
the costs of care provided by health care providers established in EU/EEA Member States 
(54). The costs of hospital treatment are covered only after prior authorisation by the 
insured person’s sickness fund (55). Crucially, the possibility to choose for reimbursement 
of health care costs was not limited to foreign care. The implementation of the case law 
thus breached a central principle of the German social security system: delivering in-kind 
health care benefits. However, several restrictions characterised the new regulation: the 
insured cannot limit their choice of reimbursement to ambulatory care only; they have to 
stick to reimbursement for at least one year; before reimbursing, the insurance fund has to 
deduct administrative and other costs (Obermaier, 2008). Obermaier (2008) argues 
however that this measure was more in continuity with German health policies than 
appears at first sight. Attempts to introduce the possibility for cash benefits had been 
made several times, also before the ECJ rulings and the category of voluntarily insured 
persons had since long the possibility to opt out of the in-kind benefits system.   
                                                 
51 Zorgverzekeringswet, Article 13. 
52 Tweede Kamer, 2002-2003, URL: http://www.st-ab.nl/wetzvwmvt.htm (accessed 28 June 2010). 
53 Kamerstukken II, 2003-04, nr. 29.763, 3, 31 and 110.  
54 Fifth Social Security Code(SSC V),amended § 13, subsection 4  
55 Ibid, Subsection 5. 
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The same reform of the health insurance system allows the sickness funds to enter from 
this time forward into agreements with foreign health care providers. These agreements 
should incorporate the requirements of German law. Only health care providers integrated 
in the public system of their country of establishment qualify (56) (Nebling and Schemken, 
2006: 139). The patient receives the medical treatment free of charge and the German 
sickness fund pays the care provider (Sylvest e.a. 2007). It is noticeable that individual 
German sickness funds anticipated this change in the law and already concluded 
agreements with foreign health care providers before the law was changed. This was in 
breach with the domestic system, in which the responsibility for concluding such 
agreements fell at that moment exclusively within the remit of the regional associations of 
sickness funds (Nebling and Schemken, 2006). Since 2004 individual sickness funds have 
also domestically gradually been able to contract with individual care providers. The ECJ 
case law thus seems to have been used by the sickness funds as an element in a strategy to 
obtain instruments for positioning themselves in an increasingly competitive domestic 
environment. 
 
In spite of increasing pressure by the European Commission, Slovenia has only marginally 
implemented the ECJ case law (Földes, 2009). The Slovenian health authorities argue that 
more clarification on the EU rules are required before they can be implemented (Földes, 
2009). Slovenia allows for the reimbursement of the costs of certain medical devices (57) 
purchased abroad without authorisation, on the basis of the costs actually incurred, which 
should not exceed the average cost in Slovenia (58). As a general rule, long waiting time 
does not constitute a justification to authorise treatment abroad. Nevertheless, the 
Slovenian Health Insurance Institute approved, by a special decision, in vitro fertilisation 
procedures abroad in cases of excessively long waiting time (59). Costs were reimbursement 
up to the amount of these services in Slovenia (Földes 2008). Interestingly, Slovenia did de 
facto also reimburse treatment obtained abroad without prior authorisation after an 
assessment of the individual cases. Two out of thirteen applications were approved for 
reimbursement in 2005 (60). This suggests that Slovenia tries to avoid that patients would 
go into litigation, by reimbursing them without a legal basis to do so.  
 
Upon accession in 2004, Hungary amended its legislation on mandatory health insurance, 
guaranteeing reimbursement of the expenses of treatment abroad up to the level 
reimbursed for the same treatment in Hungary. Nearly all non-hospital treatments were 
covered by this provision (61). A health insurance system reform in 2008 introduced a 
private-public mixed insurance system, with multiple insurers. The legal act of this reform 
(62) kept on board the procedure for reimbursement of treatment expenses for care 
received abroad. However, the rule is vaguely formulated and did not specify, for 
example, whether this reimbursement procedure applies to ambulatory care only or also to 
hospital care, and under which conditions. Implementing legal norms that would regulate 
access to planned health care abroad were envisaged, but not yet issued. (Földes, 2009). 
This suggests that Hungary tried to anticipate the adoption of the Directive on patients’ 
                                                 
56 Ibid, New § 140e. 
57 Spectacles, incontinence aids, contact lenses, ultrasound sticks, walking sticks for the visually impaired, aids for stoma 
care and cassette players with Braille typewriters. Articles 136 of the bylaws of the National Health Insurance Institute 
(HIIS). 
58 Information obtained from the Slovenian partner to the Europe for Patients (E4P) project.  
59 Fourteen treatments in 2006 
60 Information obtained from the Slovenian partner to the E4P-project. 
61 Parliamentary Act on Mandatory Health Insurance, LXXXIII/1997, Art. 27(6) 
62 Parliamentary Act on Health Insurance Funds, 2008, Art 72(4) 
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rights in cross border care when reforming its system. However, since the adoption of the 
Directive is delayed, Hungary is not able to adopt implementing measures (63). 
 
So far, Hungarian patients have not made much use of this procedure for treatment 
abroad, which is explained by the high co-payments associated to this mechanism, the 
tariffs for care being significantly higher in the Western EU countries (Földes, 2009).  
 
Poland did not yet implement the ECJ case law. Poland fears that by reimbursing care 
provided by non contracted care providers abroad, its citizens would also demand to be 
reimbursed for care by non-contracted domestic health care providers (Machalska, 2009).  
 
2.2.2 Social insurance systems based on benefits in kind: (dis-)similarities 
 
If we have a look at the social insurance systems based on benefits in kind, a first 
conclusion is that the process of implementation of the Court rulings in the older Member 
States is much more advanced then in the newer Member States, the notable example 
being Hungary. This finding seems to concur with the ‘world of dead letters’ that Treib and 
Falkner describe as regards the transposition, enforcement and application of EU 
legislation in Member States from Central and Eastern Europe (Treib, 2007). This has 
certainly partially to do with the fact that the newer Member States have to catch up with 
an ongoing process (a “moving target”), for which the guidelines are far from clear and 
remain controversial. At a time where conforming to clearly established “acquis 
communautaire” absorbs a lot of energy, they probably prefer to await clear guidelines 
before engaging in transposition of these additional rules. Since the new Member States 
only became subordinated to the ECJ instructions since 2004 (EU accession), their 
reactions can in fact be compared to the initial reactions of the older Member States. As 
discussed above, initial reactions in the EU 15 were equally rejecting. The more advanced 
implementation in Hungary might have to do with the positive attitude of Hungarian 
authorities, especially with regard to treatment of patients coming from abroad (64).  
 
On the other side of the spectre we have The Netherlands, which undoubtedly invested the 
most energy in making its system EU proof. The planned overhaul of its health care system 
ensured that the marginal costs of implementing the case law - and of making its system 
“fit” - were considerably lower. The country is also sparked by a relatively high number of 
national and European judgments, originating often from citizens dissatisfied with the 
domestic waiting lists and therefore in search for exit options. Strikingly, the risk for an 
exodus of patients due to waiting lists did not keep the Netherlands from implementing the 
Court rulings. Contrary to other countries confronted with long waiting lists and political 
pressure to address them -especially NHS systems, there was no domestic parallel sector in 
the Netherlands of care providers not integrated in the publicly funded system, and which 
could have absorbed the waiting list patients (Glinos et al., 2009). Therefore, the 
Netherlands had to turn to foreign countries for extra capacity. Furthermore, the 
Netherlands needed a larger pool of providers in order to be able to create more 
competition as an important element of the general reform of the system. The Court 
rulings were supportive for the domestic policy options: the EU internal market approach 
fitted well with the rational of the health care reform in the Netherlands, aiming to create 
more competition in the system. 
                                                 
63 At the moment of writing this paper, the Council and European Parliament issued their position in first reading and will 
now have to negotiate in view of the final adoption of this proposal.  
64 See e.g. Hungarian reply to the Commission consultation in 2006 
http://ec.europa.eu/health/ph_overview/co_operation/mobility/docs/health_services_co153_en.pdf (accessed 28 June 
2010). 
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There are striking parallels between the implementation of the Court rulings in Germany 
and the Netherlands. Both countries created the right for patients in the benefit in kind 
system to opt for reimbursement of care. This right was created not only for patients 
searching for treatment abroad, but also for patients that are treated in the domestic 
system. This measure was however less alien to the respective health systems then might 
appear at first sight: part of the population had always been privately insured, based on 
reimbursement of care. Finally, the newly created possibilities have not really been made 
attractive, in order not to encourage patients to make use of them.  
 
Many member States, especially those with a benefit in kind system, consistently voiced 
concerns that the implementation of the case law would in the longer run oblige them to 
also domestically reimburse care of non contracted providers or of providers that are not 
integrated in the publicly funded health care system.(see e.g. Palm et al. 2000). This 
concern was one of the main reasons for the slow progress in the negotiations on the 
European Commissions’ proposal for a Directive on patients’ rights in cross border care in 
the Council. The examples of Germany and the Netherlands illustrate how member states 
with a benefit in kind system try, in a creative way, to deal with this concern.  
 
Both the Netherlands and Germany also allowed for cross-border contracting. Health 
insurers can only conclude contracts with foreign hospitals that are integrated in the social 
security system of their country. Health insurers thus try to keep an eye on the quality and 
tariffs of the care provided abroad. It is the approach that fits most with these benefit in 
kind systems. Interestingly, German sickness funds referred to the possibilities in the 
Netherlands for cross-border contracting, when assessing the opportunities offered by the 
initial court rulings. Some years later, German law made this indeed possible. Sickness 
funds had however not awaited this change in legislation for actually concluding contracts 
with foreign health care providers. Similarly, Dutch sickness funds selectively concluded 
contracts with hospitals abroad at a moment they could not yet selectively contract 
hospitals domestically. Although these practices and developments are not exclusively 
attributable to the ECJ patient mobility rulings, the latter clearly played a role in this 
policy change. Sickness funds thus successfully used the case law to push through their own 
aspirations: they learned from each other’s experiences while public authorities found 
additional legitimacy in the Court rulings for domestic reforms. 
 
The most important difference between Germany and most of the other countries with 
social insurance systems based on benefits in kind is that Germany does not have supply 
problems; as a result, the willingness to travel abroad for treatment is in principle low. 
This explains why Germany, after a first rejection in principle of the Court rulings, did 
implement them quite smoothly.  
 
 
2.3 National Health Service systems 
 
The landmark ruling for this cluster of health systems was the Watts case in 2006. We 
analyse the reactions from Denmark, the UK, Sweden, Spain and Ireland in the next 
sections. 
 
2.3.1 Assessing implementation and politics 
 
In Denmark already in 1999 an interministerial working group issued a report in which it 
was conceded that the Decker/Kohll procedure had a discernable impact. However, its 
© OSE asbl 
OSE Research Paper No.3    20 
interpretation of the ‘service’ concept allowed for the exception of the entire public 
hospital sector, as well as all types of non-hospital care provided free of charge. 
Nevertheless, health services for which the insured personally paid one part and the 
competent institution the other were judged to fall under the “service” concept of the EC 
Treaty. This led to a policy reform, which allowed from the 1st of July 2000 onwards 
dental assistance, physiotherapy and chiropractic treatment to be purchased abroad, 
without prior authorisation, with subsequent fixed reimbursement from the Danish 
institutions (65). For a limited group of people, namely those who opted for a health 
protection scheme with more free choice of provider whilst paying an out of pocket 
payment for treatments, it also includes general and specialist medical treatment 
(Sindbjerg Martinsen, 2005) (66).  
 
A health care reform in 2002 aimed at bringing down waiting times for care (which were 
perceived as a major political problem) and to ensure patients a certain freedom of choice 
if the public health supply was inadequate. A waiting time guarantee offered patients a 
general right to hospital treatment outside the Danish public hospitals sector, either in 
Denmark or abroad, in the event these hospitals are unable to provide the necessary 
treatment within two months (67). As of October 2007, the waiting time guarantee has 
been further reduced to one month (Sindbjerg Martinsen and Vrangbaeck, 2008), although 
this measure was suspended again until June 2009, due to a strike among nurses in the 
spring of 2008 (Christiansen, 2009). 
 
The explanatory memorandum of the reforming law introducing the waiting time guarantee 
refers to the Court rulings as a reason for extending the right to treatment from non-
contracted providers established abroad (Sindbjerg Martinsen, 2005). De facto however, 
the choice for patients has been restricted to those private and foreign hospitals with 
which the competent Danish institution has concluded an agreement (Sindbjerg Martinsen 
and Vrangbaeck, 2008). While agreements have been concluded for 2009 with more than 
150 private hospitals or clinics in Denmark, only six foreign hospitals or clinics are 
contracted (68). The central argument for restricting treatment to contracted foreign 
providers only is that this allows the Danish authorities to exercise control over the quality 
of provision through prior assessment of overseas facilities (Sindbjerg Martinsen and 
Vrangbaeck 2008). 
 
In the wake of the Watts case in 2006, Denmark’s compliance with Community law has 
been readdressed. The day after the Watts judgment was delivered, the Danish Minister of 
Interior and Health took the view that due to the waiting time limit, scheduled to be 
lowered to one month in 2007, the judgment would not have any practical effect (69). The 
restrictive Danish definition of the concept of service is maintained: a service within the 
meaning of the EC Treaty is a service provided with the intention to make a profit and 
where the insured person pays more than half of the costs (70) (Sindbjerg Martinsen and 
Vrangbaeck, 2008). Nevertheless, the Danish interpretation of the notion of “service” was 
challenged in 2006 by the Social Appeals Board, stating that this definition was too narrow 
since it did not cover the right of all persons, including those who have right to free 
medical care, to purchase specialist health care in another Member State (Jorens and 
Hajdu, 2008). Denmark is awaiting the adoption of a European Directive before taking 
further action (Kostera, 2008).  
                                                 
65 Amendment on the Act on public health insurance, and a new executive order taking effect from 1 July 2000.  
66 Act nr. 467 of 31 May 2000 and consolidation act (lovbekendtgørelse) nr. 536 of 15 June 2000. 
67 Consolidation act nr. 143 of 25 March 2002. 
68 In Germany, Sweden and Spain. See http://www.sygehusvalg.dk/geoomraade.aspx (accessed 03/02/10). 
69 Answers to parliamentary questions no. 4965, 4967 and 4969 of 17 May 2006. 
70 Answer to parliamentary question nr. 4967 of 17 May 2006. 
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In Ireland there is no specific legislation addressing the circumstances under which insured 
persons are entitled to treatment abroad. Prior to the ECJ ruling in Watts, the Department 
of Health and Children (DOHC) took the view that due to the different nature of the Irish 
health care system from those insurance-based systems on which the health care rulings 
have been developed, this case law was not applicable to the Irish health system. 
Nevertheless, since the Watts case, the competent Department is more prudent, stating 
that this judgement “may mean that the rules can be applied more extensively but this is 
not yet fully clear” (71). 
 
There are however some benefits which can be purchased abroad. The Irish system 
provides for limited insurance based dental, aural and optical care. Previously the 
provision of such care was confined to providers in Ireland, but from 2005 persons are 
allowed to avail of services abroad and to receive the standard payment or the actual cost 
(whichever is lower) (Cousins, 2006).  
 
Furthermore, since 2002 patients who have been waiting longest for procedures in public 
hospitals, the National Treatment Purchase Fund was set up. Almost 150.000 patients have 
been treated through this fund until 2009 (72). It purchases mainly domestic care in private 
hospitals. Only two hospitals in Northern Ireland are included in the scheme (73).  
 
The initial position of the authorities in the United Kingdom was that the principles on 
which the Kohll and Decker rulings are based do not apply to the National Health Service.  
Nevertheless, in practice regional authorities reimbursed patients in cases which could 
potentially have ended up before the ECJ, in order to avoid possible precedents (Palm et 
al., 2000).  
 
After the Geraets-Smits and Peerbooms rulings of 2001, defining that in-kind benefit 
systems fell within the scope of the free movement of services, and that if a Member State 
could not provide a treatment “without undue delay”, patients had the right to seek 
treatment abroad, the then secretary of State, Alan Milburn declared that the decision was 
of great importance and required the NHS to re-examine its practice on the funding of 
overseas treatment. This was done after initial suggestions that the Peerbooms ruling was 
of limited significance (Montgomery, 2005).  Montgomery suggests that the Court rulings 
and political pressure to address waiting lists were used by the government and reinforced 
its determination to shorten waiting times, make the NHS more businesslike and increase 
patient choice (Montgomery, 2005). As a consequence, since 2002, the UK allows local 
health commissioners in England to commission treatments from hospitals within the EU for 
the treatment of NHS patients. Since 2004 however, patients were no longer sent through 
this procedure. It is argued that the procedure was actually set up mainly to put pressure 
on domestic private providers to lower their prices when contracting with the NHS, which 
was also part of the NHS reform (Glinos et al., 2006).  
 
Following the Watts case, which concerned a UK citizen, the Department of Health issued 
an advice to local health care commissioners on handling requests for care in other 
European countries, with detailed guidance (Department of Health, 2007). This advice can 
be seen as a reaction to the Court criticism that the NHS lacked clear criteria for managing 
its prior authorisation procedures. It allows for the funding of planned hospital care abroad 
                                                 
71 http://www.dohc.ie/public/information/hospital_services/hospital_treatment_abroad.html?lang=en, (accessed 09.02.10) 
72 Seehttp://www.citizensinformation.ie/categories/health/hospital-services/national_patient_treatment_register 
(accessed 06.10.10); http://www.ntpf.ie/home (accessed 2/8/09) 
73 http://www.ntpf.ie/where ( accessed 2/8/09)  
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after prior authorisation, when care cannot be provided without undue delay in the NHS, 
either through the Regulation based procedure or the Treaty based procedure. It suggests 
that the Treaty based procedure is in the interest of the patient only when the treating 
hospital is not integrated in the public system of the country of treatment.  
 
For ambulatory care the advice distinguishes between services for which it is not necessary 
for local health care commissioners to put in place prior authorisation processes such as GP 
consultations, optometry, pharmacy and some dental treatments. By contrast for services 
whose complexity and cost make them more similar to services provided in hospitals the 
requirement for prior authorisation may be justified. The latter might include services 
subject to referral or which are parts of complex patient pathways. The advice warns that 
particular care is needed for handling requests for dental care abroad since it is difficult to 
establish after the event whether any treatment undertaken abroad was clinically 
necessary and therefore of a sort that would have been provided by the NHS. It is 
suggested to limit reimbursement to the average cost paid by commissioners for the 
equivalent NHS course of treatment.  
 
In October 2009, the Department of Health circulated draft regulations and a draft update 
of the 2007 advice, aiming to create a legal base in UK domestic legislation for decisions 
on prior authorisation and reimbursement of costs for treatment abroad (74). It applies to 
England and Wales only. These proposals were drafted in the light of the publication of the 
proposal for an EU Directive on patients’ rights in cross border care; but they are also in 
line with plans to turn some NHS targets, including increasing patient choice, into 
enforceable patient entitlements. 
 
Compared to the 2007 advice, these documents narrow the definition of health services 
that can be assimilated to hospital care and for which prior authorisation thus will be 
required. They include surgery, services which require the use of specialised and cost-
intensive medical infrastructure and equipment, and specialised services which require 
high levels of finance or planning. 
 
With regard to reimbursement levels the documents suggest that, where there is no tariff, 
a price will need to be calculated, and average costs which can be shown to have been 
reasonably calculated may be used. If commissioners are however unable to work out an 
objective cost, or appropriately decode EU receipts for health care, they may face the 
prospect of reimbursing the full costs of treatment.  
 
The documents also provide guidance for the treatment of patients coming from abroad. 
Lack of service capacity is likely to be the strongest ground for rejecting a request for 
treatment of a non-UK patient. Providers who receive requests from EEA patients under 
the Treaty based route should assume that the patients wish to be treated in the same way 
as an NHS patient, unless they specifically state that they wish to be treated privately. If 
they wish to be treated privately, they can be charged at the equivalent cost to UK private 
patients. 
 
When they were handed down, the Swedish Government believed that the Kohll and 
Decker rulings did not apply to its health system, and that treatments received under a 
benefits in kind system do not constitute an economic activity (Palm et. al, 2000). 
However, following two national court rulings based on the ECJ case law in 2004, things 
began to change.  
                                                 
74 http://www.dh.gov.uk/en/Publicationsandstatistics/Publications/PublicationsPolicyAndGuidance/DH_107296 (accessed 
06.07.10) 
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Since 2004 some de facto criteria for decisions on reimbursement of care received abroad 
are established, according to the principles established by the ECJ. No system for prior 
authorisation applies. Applications for reimbursement can only be made after treatment 
abroad. These criteria do not refer to the waiting period for treatment in Sweden (Sylvest 
et al., 2007). In the year following the ruling, applications for reimbursement for care 
abroad rose dramatically and the overwhelming majority (75) were approved (Blomqvist and 
Larsson, 2009). In a reaction, a proposal for a law was presented by an expert committee 
in 2006. According to the proposal, prior authorisation would be required for hospital care 
abroad. The adoption of the proposal was however blocked by the new center-right 
government later in 2006 (Blomqvist and Larsson, 2009).  
 
Furthermore, in a response to domestic controversy over waiting times, a national waiting 
time guarantee was established in 2005, ensuring that no patient in Sweden should have to 
wait longer than 90 days. This measure was however also considered as a measure 
addressing the threats the ECJ case law with regard to “undue delay” could represent for 
the Swedish system. According to Blomqvist and Larsson, the Court rulings may have 
helped the Ministry in persuading the county councils to agree with the waiting time 
guarantee (Blomqvist and Larsson, 2009). 
 
In Spain, no changes to the legal system to incorporate the ECJ rulings have been made so 
far. It is perceived that more legislative guidance at an EU level is required (Sylvest e.a., 
2007). 
 
2.3.2 National Health Service systems: (dis-)similarities 
 
In this cluster of case studies, we see again some important parallelism.  
 
First, all these countries took initiatives to reduce waiting lists and to offer patients more 
choice of provider when they could not be treated with undue delay in the public health 
system. Although these measures were in the first place a response to domestic political 
pressure, there was in most countries also an interaction with the EU level developments. 
In each of these cases patients were given, primarily the right to be treated domestically, 
outside the public sector. In addition, possibilities were provided to be treated in 
contracted hospitals abroad. However, only very few hospitals abroad were included in the 
schemes. Furthermore, the ECJ Court rulings were used by policymakers aiming to 
introduce the treatment guarantees as arguments to get their policy accepted. And the 
other way round, the existence of treatment guarantees was used to argue that no further 
adaptation to the domestic health systems was needed in order to comply with further ECJ 
rulings. Domestic political efforts to enact formal patient rights to care are thus supported 
(see e.g. Blomqvist and Larsson, 2009). 
 
These countries thus took measures that reduced the demand to exit the system, by 
addressing the problem of waiting times. The marginal number of providers contracted 
abroad suggests that they are rather a side effect of contracting the domestic private 
sector and aim to make the domestic contracting system EU compatible. This contrasts 
with the Dutch system, where contracting abroad was the only option to increase capacity 
in the short term.  
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Secondly, the process of institutional adaptation to the ECJ Court rulings is clearly slower 
and started clearly later in the NHS cluster. It is only after the 2006 Watts case - when it 
became indisputable that the free movement of services principles also apply to care 
provided abroad to patients affiliated to a National Health Service system - that these 
systems are seriously considering to implement the principles of the Court. In Sweden, 
which was confronted with national court rulings, the process started earlier. When the 
Watts case was issued, it was already clear that the European Commission would bring 
forward a specific legislative proposal on patient mobility. Therefore, several of these 
countries seem to be awaiting the adoption of this Directive before taking further action. 
It is interesting to see how the NHS is already anticipating on the adoption of this 
Directive. 
  
Finally, the UK advice to local health care commissioners and the recent draft proposals 
illustrate how complex cost calculations and the definition of the benefit package can be 
in NHS systems, where care provision is mainly public; where there is often neither money 
transfer nor a price for the provided treatments. 
 
Conclusions 
 
This paper aimed at opening the black box regarding the actual (as opposed potential) 
impact of European Integration on national health care systems. We tried to do so by 
examining how the European Union interacts with national health care policies as a result 
of rulings of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) with regard to patient mobility.  
 
We tried to find out how Member States deal with the deregulatory dynamic of the 
applications of the free movement rules to health care. 
 
Our empirical assessment – covering thirteen Member States which belong to different 
families of health care systems – looked into the factors that determine the mechanisms 
and timing of ECJ case law finding its way into national arenas. Furthermore we tried to 
understand whether and how this case law impacts on the interactions between the 
stakeholders in the domestic arena.  
 
A first finding of this analysis is that the ECJ rulings regarding patient mobility provoke a 
number of similar but far from identical responses across the Member States when they 
initiate processes of adaptation to the Court ruling by reducing the misfit between EU and 
domestic legal provisions. These adaptation processes are not straightforward and 
represent creative responses in a context of legal uncertainty: 
 
- initially most Member States opt for limited interpretation of the scope of 
application of the rulings. In other words: they reject the scenario that the Court 
rulings would be applicable to their system (“our system is different from the 
system in question in the Court case”); 
- services that are provided on a fee for service basis (often including dental care) 
and medical products are typically the first to which the principles established by 
the ECJ are applied; 
- Member States require that the treatment abroad complies with the conditions for 
funding care domestically; 
- Member States try to channel patient mobility through procedures that are ‘fit’ to 
their own system and discourage procedures that are less fit. For example, where 
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the domestic system is based on benefits in kind, the attempt is to channel patients 
abroad through contracted providers;  
- nearly all Member States try to keep some grip on the selection of providers 
abroad, e.g. by requiring that they are integrated in the statutory system of the 
Member State of care provision. 
 
Member States thus try to uphold their steering instruments while allowing patients to be 
treated abroad. They try to copy as much as they can the requirements for funding care at 
home to care delivered abroad. Progressively, however, they realise that doing so is not EU 
proof, as a result of which some of the requirements applicable at home are dropped for 
care provided abroad. 
 
Secondly, our research enables to identify some of the factors that may explain the 
considerable differences between the reactions of Member States - also between Member 
States with similar health systems - to the ECJ rulings regarding patient mobility. The most 
important factors which determine the pattern of adaptation to EU pressure are: 
 
- the degree in which Member governments have been faced with national and 
European Court Cases. 
- the likelihood that patients will effectively use the new mobility option (e.g. 
because of domestic waiting lists);  
- the degree of institutional fit/misfit between the domestic and EU setting (e.g. 
existence of reimbursement tariffs); 
- the presence of reforms of the domestic health care system, certainly if these 
domestic reforms aim to create more competition in the system. 
 
Thirdly, the empirical material confirms the assertion - which has been voiced for some 
time now (see e.g. Palm et al., 2000) - that these ECJ rulings regarding patient mobility 
have potentially an important impact on the domestic care systems. The possibilities 
created in the reformed Dutch and German system to allow patients to exit from the 
contracting system – also for care provided at home - is an example thereof. The impact 
thereof so far must however not be overestimated. The discussed examples were more in 
continuity with the domestic health policies than appeared at first sight. 
 
The described domestic strategies make it clear that the process of ‘adaptation’ to the 
Court rulings is not a simple command-and-control process, but rather a process of 
creative response to EU law. Strategies include – for Member States confronted with long 
waiting lists – attempts to reduce the demand for exit, e.g. through contracting the 
domestic commercial sector. Policies addressing waiting times, although rarely explicitly 
justified by the case law, might in reality well be one of the most important results of the 
Court rulings. 
 
Furthermore, we provided evidence of agency by domestic actors who draw legitimacy 
from the EU setting to reinforce their position (or acquire one) at the national level. 
Examples include: 
 
- threats to question the domestic contracting system, with as a result that 
compliance has been assured by a strong (and effective) increase of doctor’s fees 
(Luxemburg); 
- setting up of a broad coalition pushing for commercialisation of hospital services 
(Belgium); 
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- selective contracting by sickness funds in Germany and the Netherlands. 
 
These examples illustrate how the jurisprudence can encourage more competitive 
behaviour of insurers, and more commercial behaviour and price increases from providers. 
 
Also public authorities make use of the jurisprudence to support domestic reform agendas, 
such as the enactment of formal patients’ rights (Sweden), addressing waiting times, make 
the health care system more businesslike and increase patient choice (UK) or the 
introduction of more competition in the system (the Netherlands). 
 
Finally, the case studies also provide examples illustrating the interaction between 
national policies implementing the Court rulings and EU level policies and jurisprudence.  
Several Member States interpreted the concept of hospital care -for which prior 
authorisation is required- as extending to certain forms of care that do not involve 
overnight stay. This can be considered as a creative interpretation of the ECJ concept of 
intramural care. The possibility to extend the definition of hospital care to certain forms 
of out patient care has next been incorporated by the Commission in its proposal for a 
Directive on patients’ rights in cross border care. Furthermore, the European Court of 
Justice, referred in more recent case law explicitly to this wider definition as stipulated in 
the Commissions’ proposal (76).   
 
More research on this topic is needed to assess the extent to which the ‘effect’ of the 
Europeanisation of health care systems is influenced by the degree in which Member States 
are involved in ‘shaping’ the EU policy space on this topic. This ‘uploading’ dimension, 
which would acknowledge the Europeanisation of health care policies and politics as a two-
way-street (Hamel and Vanhercke, 2009), has so far only marginally been taken on board in 
the literature (nor has it in this paper). The policy process with regard to the adoption of 
the Directive on patients’ rights in cross border care certainly provides ample 
opportunities to analyse this uploading dimension. In turn, the expected entry into force of 
this Directive will again set in motion important dynamics at domestic level which might 
well go beyond what we found in this analysis. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
76 Case C-169/07 Hartlauer Handelsgesellschaft mbH v Wiener Landesregierung, Oberösterreichische Landesregierung, 
Opinion of the AG of 9 September 2008, note 44 
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